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Abstract 
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financial and economic crisis – point to huge challenges for the organisation and 
policies of the European Union. The present paper concentrates on the risks that the 
crises represent for one of the EU’s prime objectives, to achieve a civilised wider 
European order. At least the current episodes show that with leadership the EU can 
act fast in both diplomacy and finance. But the next question is how to follow 
through, beyond a passing moment of an effective six-month presidency of the EU. 
This is the subject of the present note, which advocates a comprehensive upgrading 
of the EU’s policies in the wider European area, and contributes ideas for the 
revision of the European Security Strategy currently being prepared. The aim would 
be to strengthen EU policies towards South-East Europe, Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia, and defuse the current confrontation between a normative Europe and an 
aggressive Russian realpolitik; better still Russia might, after reflecting on what the 
two crises mean for its fundamental interests, conclude that the time had come for 
a more genuinely cooperative understanding with the EU. 
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THE STRUGGLE FOR A CIVILISED 
WIDER EUROPEAN ORDER 
ELEMENTS FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY 
CEPS WORKING DOCUMENT NO. 307/OCTOBER 2008 
MICHAEL EMERSON
* 
1.  Crisis No 1: The Georgian-Russian war  
Recent years have seen growing unease between the EU and Russia, most notably over the 
common neighbourhood of European states that lie between them. But then in August war 
exploded. While a short and small war, it was still a seismic political event, and its possible 
implications stretch out as a large shadow over the future of the wider Europe. To say the least, 
it confirms the need for the EU to form an adequate strategy for the pan-European space. 
Russia had for years been pursuing tactics of creeping annexation of the Georgian secessionist 
entities, and encouraging a continuous stream of provocative pin-pricks, which ultimately 
‘succeeded’ in bringing on Saakashvili’s catastrophic attack on Tskhinvali on 7-8 August 2008. 
Russia then had the option just to push Georgian troops out of South Ossetia. Instead it chose to 
invade Georgia-proper, and the world watched Russian tanks in action on the road from Gori to 
Tbilisi. Russian public opinion has been persuaded that this was a great humanitarian victory, 
and President Medvedev underlined Russia’s will to defend its citizens anywhere. The rest of 
Europe was left to reflect on the implications for other places where there are large ethnic-
Russian populations as well as Russian military bases, such as Transnistria and Crimea. 
The war in Georgia also revealed two surprises. The first was that the United States proved too 
distracted to restrain Saakashvili from his catastrophic decision to attack Tshkinvali, after 
having pushed through the improvised declaration that Georgia and Ukraine “will be members 
of NATO” in November 2007 at the Bucharest NATO summit. 
The second was the comparative success of President Sarkozy’s rapid-reaction mediation, with 
a unified and carefully-measured EU position. This brought the crisis under control, at a 
moment when Russian tanks could have advanced into Georgia’s capital city Tbilisi within 
hours. It may have opened up prospects for a meaningful process of strategic diplomacy with 
Russia for the longer-run future. But for this to be successful there has to be a definite upgrading 
of the EU’s foreign and security policies, and in particular for the wider Europe. This is not 
assured – far from it. But the August war in Georgia has at least begun to reveal the potential 
that the EU has been incubating.  
2.  Crisis No 2: The global financial crash and recession  
The global financial and economic crisis is in the course of transforming itself from what was 
initially a matter of saving major financial institutions in the West into a global recession with 
especially harmful impacts on weaker economies. The US and EU have been able to mobilize 
unprecedented sums – trillions of dollars and euro – to save their banks from systemic collapse. 
Initially the impact on the rest of the world was not appreciated. Avoidance of systemic collapse 
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of the world’s major financial institutions was the obvious and overwhelming priority. But in 
addition the crisis was seen as one centred on the inadequate regulation of highly complex 
financial instruments, such as derivatives, securitized sub-prime mortgages and hedge funds, 
which did not concern economies with weakly developed financial markets.  
But now the story is looking different, and notably so in the wider Europe beyond the eurozone 
and the UK. From Hungary and Romania to the Baltic states, and from Turkey to Ukraine, and 
in Russia too, the possible damages are increasingly ominous. This wider Europe finds itself 
exposed in several ways. With the huge financial resources deployed by the US and the major 
EU economies to save their own banks there seems to be a flight of mobile capital to these 
relatively safe havens. Credit availability in the poorer European economies is drying up or has 
simply stopped. This is compounded by two other problems. The economies of the wider 
Europe are vulnerable to exchange rate instability, unlike the eurozone. Moreover they have in 
many cases seen substantial hard currency borrowing by households (mortgages) as well as 
corporations and governments, and with currency depreciation they suffer immediate burdens of 
debt service and risk premium on interest rates. Already the International Monetary Fund has 
had to extend a large $16.5 billion loan to Ukraine. The European Central Bank very rapidly 
extended a loan of 5 billion euro to Hungary, which is its first operation of this type outside the 
eurozone.  
The full force of the global recession has yet to hit these economies, however. This leads to the 
tion of how the political regimes of these countries are going to fare. Ukraine is massively 
vulnerable, combining now several years of virtual political paralysis with the new financial 
crisis. But the risks of political instability run far wider, to wherever the pre-existing political 
situation is tense, and this can concern countries closer to the EU such as Turkey, Serbia and 
Macedonia, as well as several new member states. Even Russia, which a few months ago was 
enjoying unprecedented wealth with the $140/barrel oil price, is now suffering substantial losses 
of financial reserves with the collapse of the oil price by over a half in a matter of weeks, and 
crisis conditions for major enterprises now caught with over-leveraged debt.  
3.  The European systemic response 
The double crises of the war in Georgia and the global financial crash are both of profound 
importance, and oblige European leaders to assess what systemic responses are called for. As 
history repeatedly tells us, it takes real crisis to break through the inertia of the status quo.  
3.1 Lisbon  Treaty 
The innovations of the Lisbon Treaty are of the highest importance in two respects: first are the 
institutional reforms, with the permanent Council Presidency, the ‘Foreign Minister’ (in all but 
name) combining the roles of today’s Solana and the Commission Vice-President, and the 
unification of Council and Commission services in a single External Action Service (an EU 
‘Foreign Office’ in all but name). The need for these innovations has been dramatically 
illustrated by the Georgia war, when the question: “What if there had not been a vigorous 
French Presidency?” is put. Valid question. The Lisbon Treaty provisions are meant be an 
answer, but all will depend upon whether the member states will then be prepared to elect a 
leader of outstanding quality.  
The Lisbon Treaty contains provisions for “Permanent Structured Cooperation” in the defence 
domain, which will bring together the militarily capable member states, and set out on the path 
towards a more effective military capability for the EU. This could be organised with or without 
the Lisbon Treaty, however. THE STRUGGLE FOR A CIVILISED WIDER EUROPEAN ORDER | 3 
 
Finally, the Lisbon Treaty is needed to put the enlargement process back on track. There should 
be a gradual and more carefully conditioned enlargement process, waiting also for the EU to 
digest its recent huge enlargement. But still the incentive and open possibilities for future 
accession need to be visible and credible in order to drive a continuing Europeanisation of the 
wider neighbourhood, and to impress Russia with the way the wider Europe prefers to go. The 
messages to the Western Balkans, Turkey and Ukraine have to be clarified.  
3.2 European  security  strategy 
The first European Security Strategy document of December 2003 is due to be revised precisely 
five years on, with a new text expected from the Council and Commission in December 2008. 
Rereading the 2003 text shows that it remains valid in parts, but was already in need of 
substantial revision even before the two new crises. The 2003 text was heavily weighted with 
the terrorist threat and the need for the EU to become a more capable foreign and security policy 
actor.  
The capability factor has seen impressive development, to judge by the proliferation of ESDP 
and related missions in the domain of crisis management. While the shaping up of military and 
civilian (police, judiciary) capabilities remain well behind declared plans,
1 and the qualitative 
performance of the early missions has been criticised,
2 the number, variety and geographic 
reach of these missions has advanced impressively (7 in the Balkans, 3 in the Middle East, 4 in 
Africa, 3 in the Eastern neighbourhood, 1 in Afghanistan, 1 in South-East Asia). The political 
acceptability of EU missions in highly contested theatres of operation reveals the perceived trust 
with which the EU is viewed: such as at the Rafah border between Gaza and Egypt, the border 
mission around Transnistria, and the new monitoring mission in Georgia.  
However a much wider set of major concerns for the EU now need full recognition in the 
forthcoming 2008 security strategy document: energy security, climate change security, 
financial security, stability in Eastern Europe, and Russia.  
The case for an effective common energy policy is emphasised once again by the war in 
Georgia, when the Russian military occupied territory alongside the arterial Baku-Tbilisi-
Turkey oil and gas pipelines, and actually blew up railway bridges carrying Caspian oil to Black 
Sea ports, with mines also destroying a train carrying Azeri oil. The EU’s strategic energy 
diversification agenda is well known: improved gas network interconnections, expanded LNG 
reception facilities, new gas pipelines including possibly a trans-Saharan project as well as 
Nabucco, renewal and expansion of nuclear generating capacity, expansion of renewables such 
as solar and wind power, etc. This is vital to reduce the hazard of excessive dependence on 
Russian gas supplies, which becomes a politico-moral hazard on both sides. For Russia the 
temptation to use the energy weapon politically is obvious, and for over-dependent Europeans 
the vulnerability to this is equally so. 
The climate change agenda is now approaching a critical point, both for the negotiators of the 
post-Kyoto (post-2012) regime, and for the risk that global warming may reach a catastrophic 
point of no-return in a few decades. However for the EU the energy security and climate change 
security concerns are not only compatible but can be mutually reinforcing. There are prospects 
for major advances in international climate change policy with the next US administration, 
which (with either candidate) seems likely to adopt a ‘cap-and-trade’ system for CO2 emissions 
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compatible with the EU’s own policies. With this the scene will be set to propose to other major 
CO2 polluters policies following the same logic. While China with its huge expansion of coal-
burning power stations will be the biggest challenge, for the EU the cases of Russia and Ukraine 
are of particular importance. Both countries got a free ride from ‘Kyoto’, given the big drop in 
their CO
2 emissions in the early 1990s with the drop in industrial production accompanying the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. However these countries’ energy efficiency remains very poor. 
For Russia improved energy efficiency would contribute an improvement of the supply/demand 
balance equivalent to huge new oil and gas discoveries; for Ukraine it would mean a substantial 
reduction of strategic dependence on Russia. 
Financial security is the new surprise item on the agenda. Ever since the euro and European 
Central Bank became operational, lonely voices have warned of the risks inherent in the lender-
of-last-resort function remaining at the level of national competencies, while the banking and 
monetary system was becoming truly integrated at the European level.
3 The current systemic 
failure compounds the failure of US regulatory policies for the new financial instruments 
(derivatives and securitised mortgages, etc) with the EU’s failure to match the euro as common 
currency with a corresponding regulatory regime. This double systemic failure is now seen, as 
mentioned, to inflict collateral damage on the transition economies in Eastern Europe, with 
consequential risks of political destabilisation. 
In many East European countries the banking system is substantially owned by major EU banks, 
which – as credit in these countries dries up – implies a responsibility for the EU to act on a 
macroeconomically significant scale. At the level of systemic response, Gros and Micossi 
propose an emergency creation for a European Financial Stability Fund, under which the 
European Investment Bank would raise bond finance in order to finance both the 
recapitalization of European banks and balance of payments support to East European 
economies heavily dependent on the EU.
4 These EU-backed bonds would be attractive for 
mobile global capital, which for the moment is avoiding the debt instruments of individual 
European countries in favour of US Treasury paper, with the consequent weakening of the euro 
exchange rate. Gros and Micossi advocate a massive infusion of capital in order to prevent the 
crisis from getting worse in the EU banking sector and in the entire economies of the European 
periphery. The Fund should be mandated to operate in the new EU member states, South East 
Europe and the Eastern Partnership countries. Financial security has suddenly become crucial to 
European strategic security. 
The major security concerns are now discussed with specific reference to policies of the EU 
towards Russia and the several regions of the European neighbourhood.  
4.  Wider European dimensions 
4.1 Russia   
Having cast aside the Soviet system and any idea of its restoration, Russia has laid the 
foundations of a state that is completely compatible with the rest of Europe, or to be 
precise, with the best of all that makes up the common heritage of European 
civilisation. President Dmitry Medvedev, Berlin, 5 June 2008.
5  
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Concerning the August war there are two political debates now going on, one in Russia and the 
other in Europe and the West. The Russian debate is along the spectrum of views between those 
advancing aggressively nationalist and voluntarily isolationist arguments, and those advocating 
the modernisation and international integration (as President Medvedev suggests) agenda. 
Tensions can be observed between these two tendencies, with the ultra-nationalists rejoicing in 
victory over Georgia, and relishing further victories and a more fundamental confrontation with 
the West, and even a decisive move to total self-reliance. The modernisers are more cautious, 
understand that their programme needs increasing participation in the international economy, 
and notes the damage inflicted on Russian financial markets by the combination of the global 
financial crisis and the war with Georgia.  
The spectrum of European positions towards Russia is well known for its range from those who 
would be quick to support sanctions, to those who argue that sanctions will only prove 
counterproductive and who affect disinterest in complaints over Russian actions in the post-
Soviet states.  
But can there be a possible middle ground for the EU between these opposites, which could 
prove both feasible as a unifying position within the EU and more successful in achieving 
objectives in relation to Russia? President Sarkozy’s active diplomacy these last weeks, 
mediating the 6-point peace plan between Moscow and Tbilisi, has at least opened up this 
possibility. The 6-point peace plan has some loose ends, which may prove difficult to tie up. But 
the process of producing it, with Sarkozy’s two visits to Moscow on 12 August and 8 
September, saw face-to-face diplomacy between the EU and Russian leaderships of a vivid 
quality not seen so far, with Medvedev apparently sensitive to the costs to his international 
reputation if he did not keep his word in securing the withdrawal of Russian troops from 
Georgia-proper. 
This leads precisely into the question of the interactions between these two political spectrums, 
the Russian one between ultra-nationalists and modernisers, and the European one between the 
hard sanction camp and the soft engagement camp. 
There is a logic emerging, but not the simple symmetrical one that might be supposed, in which 
the two hard positions might fight it out, whereas the two soft positions might combine happily. 
On the contrary, it seems that both hypothetical extreme European positions – hard and soft – 
would play into the hands of the Russian nationalists. The hard position leaves the Russian 
nationalists boosting their paranoiac rhetoric and willingly going further down the path of 
isolation, self-reliance and disengagement from the West’s economy and institutions. The soft 
position for its part encourages Moscow to adopt increasingly ambitious revanchist foreign 
policy objectives. In the present context this would mean moving on from ‘victory’ in Georgia 
to comparable ‘victories’ in achieving hegemonic influence first perhaps in Moldova and then in 
Ukraine. Hopefully without war, but leaving in place the reminder that Russia is willing to use 
military means to achieve its objectives.  
On the other hand the middle ground position that Sarkozy has taken may be capable of 
connecting with the interests of Russia’s modernisers. In recent weeks we have seen the 
combined impact of the generally negative international political response to Russia’s invasion 
of Georgia and the sanctions of world financial markets, the latter in their deepest crisis since 
the great depression of the 1930s. Russia’s President says that his country should not isolate 
itself. Major Russian business interests have found themselves squeezed financially, having 
bought business expansion with money borrowed against collateral guarantees of stockholdings, 
whose value has collapsed. How far the war in Georgia and the global financial crisis have 
interacted is a matter of speculation. But international analysts and investors have put together 
three specimen acts by the Russian authorities in 2008: Prime Minister Putin’s rhetorical attack 
on the Mechel metallurgy business, the murky affair of TNK-BP where board room conflict was 6 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
intertwined with official bureaucratic harassment, and the invasion of Georgia. This sequence of 
actions, one entirely domestic, one an international business affair, and one an international 
security affair, have interacted to worsen the perceived risk-rating of Russia to one of near zero 
trust. To this is now added the dramatic decline of the oil price from $140 to $64 in a matter of 
weeks.  
This gives the Kremlin and the (Russian) White House something to think about. On Friday 19 
September, President Medvedev said in a speech: “We are in fact being pushed onto the 
development track which is not based on sound, normal and civilized cooperation, but rests on 
autonomous development behind thick walls and an ‘iron curtain’. I would like to stress once 
again: this is not our track. There is no use returning back to the past. We have made our 
choice.”
6 By the opaque standards of Kremlinology, nothing could be clearer than that. The 
modernisers are being pushed back from ‘our choice and our track’.  
However Sarkozy’s face-to-face diplomacy in the Kremlin is just the possible beginning of a 
long and complex story. How might it develop? How should the EU follow through?  
At the time of writing the negotiations between the EU and Russia over a new comprehensive 
agreement are suspended, pending Russia’s compliance with the 6-point agreement.  
Before the August war the official negotiating positions on the content of a new agreement to 
replace the expiring Partnership and Cooperation Agreement appeared to be quite widely 
separated. Russia has been advocating a short framework document. The EU has been 
advocating a more operational, legally-binding and comprehensive text covering multiple 
sectors of policy. In principle the task is to build on the documents adopted in May 2005 for the 
four ‘common spaces’ for economic relations, justice and home affairs, education and culture, 
and external security. However the process seems somewhat unreal, given the number of 
friction points that have been continuously arising, and which contradict either the spirit or the 
possible content of a new agreement.  
The start of the negotiation process, agreed at the EU-Russia Summit of July 2008 under the 
French Presidency, had earlier been held up because of objections by two member states in 
succession. Poland blocked the opening of the process because of the Russian ban on meat 
imports, which originated in some apparently legitimate complaints about Polish quality 
controls, but became a long saga of non-transparent and unconstructive behaviour on the 
Russian side. When this dispute was finally resolved it was the turn of Lithuania to object with a 
position that had at its background the stopping in 2006 of oil pipeline supplies from Russia to 
the major Lithuanian oil refinery, after its privatization sale had gone to Polish rather than 
Russian bidders. Environmental problems with the pipeline were invoked, but there was an 
obvious disinterest on the Russian side in repairing them. The Lithuanian position then became 
a more general complaint about coercive Russian policies in the near abroad. The Lithuanian 
blockage was finally removed after internal negotiations within the EU.  
These two blocking positions were however only two out of a much longer list of complaints by 
individual member states over Russian actions or inactions. The Ukraine gas dispute, when 
Russia turned off the gas tap on 1 January 2006, was the first shock, carrying the spectre of 
collateral damage of strategic importance for the European economy. This was followed by 
multiple acts of implicitly or explicitly coercive policy towards ‘uncooperative neighbours’. The 
Estonian monument affair (2007) saw deliberate escalation of tensions by Russia and some first 
cyber attacks on Estonian e-government. While the original decision to move the Soviet war 
memorial was controversial in Estonia itself, ill-feeling in the EU over Russia’s exaggerated 
response progressively built up. In the UK the Litvinenko affair, with the polonium murder in 
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London of a former KGB agent in 2006, caused a grave deterioration in diplomatic relations and 
public perceptions between the two countries. This was followed in 2008 by another totally 
different but serious friction point over the TNK-BP company, in which the British party in this 
major investment in the Russian energy sector found itself subject to grave official bureaucratic 
harassment of its personnel in Russia coinciding with a struggle for control between 
shareholders. Finland became concerned for its paper industry in 2008 when Russia adopted 
export duties on timber, which are contrary at least in spirit to Russia’s WTO application. 
Russia’s trade policy sanctions towards both Moldova and Georgia in the period 2005-7, 
banning imports of wines in particular, were manifestly political in motivation. They were 
executed in ways that would have been illegal for WTO members, thus confirming alongside 
the timber export duties the thinness of Russia’s commitment to its WTO membership 
application. In July 2008 oil pipeline supplies from Russia to the Czech Republic suddenly 
stopped, the week after the signing of the agreement between the Czech Republic and the US 
over missile defence installations. 
This long list of complaints raises two broader issues: what is the pattern on the Russian side, 
and what should be the response on the EU side? The pattern is one in which Russia chooses 
measures to widen the divide the EU between those member states it perceives to be Russia-
friendly and those it perceives to be anti-Russian. The issue of solidarity within the EU in 
response to such acts gradually mounts. EU member states that have major economic ties with 
Russia, notably Germany and Italy, are extremely loath to enter into a process of escalating 
tensions over matters that are the bilateral concerns of others. But this pattern of Russian actions 
poses the question of when should a friction point be regarded as a purely bilateral affair, and 
when should it become a matter of EU solidarity. The legal-institutional view is to consider 
whether EU competences are affected: obviously not for the Estonian monument affair, and 
obviously yes for the Finnish timber export duty affair. But this is a narrow criterion when 
issues of political principle are involved, over what can be considered acceptable, or 
unacceptable political behaviour such as coercive pressures. The EU has not adopted an explicit 
position on its possible solidarity policy, but Russia has been building up the case for this, even 
before the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008. 
Against this background discussion of the possible content of a new agreement may be regarded 
as a hypothetical exercise. We can review these possibilities, supposing that each of the four 
common spaces would be more strongly developed. In fact the exercise is important in itself to 
illustrate what this other world might consist of, compared to the present sad state of affairs.  
In the economic domain there is a clear potential agenda. WTO accession should be secured, 
bringing rule-bound stability to Russian trade policy, after which the question of free trade with 
the EU can be engaged. Given that the EU is progressively negotiating free trade agreements 
with its other European neighbours there can be the ultimate vision of a pan-European economic 
space. This would require however a change of perception by Russia over the nature of its long-
run economic interests. Russia’s economic modernisation, and escape from reliance on raw 
material production, requires economic openness. Yet there is a widespread opinion within 
Russian political circles that free trade would only benefit the EU. Indeed there is a vocal ultra-
nationalist argument that Russia should make itself more if not totally self-reliant economically. 
So there is a question of political judgement and choice for Russia to make, and which is not yet 
made at the level of real policy, beyond the rhetoric about modernisation. 
The second major economic chapter concerns energy. Years of high level ‘energy dialogue’ has 
shown how difficult it is to move beyond mere dialogue into the negotiation of binding 
agreements at the policy level. Major investment and trading contracts are made, but the 
overarching framework remains elusive. The possible use of the Energy Charter Treaty to 
regulate conditions of pipeline transit failed in 2006, after Gazprom refused to countenance 8 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
open access to its pipeline network. On the contrary Gazprom has been sustaining a massive 
drive to extend its monopolistic control over gas supplies from Central Asia as well as Russia, 
with efforts to extend its reach into North (Algeria, Libya) and West (Nigeria) Africa as well.  
One idea is that the EU-Russia agreement could do at the bilateral level what could not be 
agreed multilaterally through the Energy Charter Treaty, although what that might mean is not 
evident. Certainly the rules for trade, investment and climate change policy in the energy sector 
have huge agendas for possible negotiation. For trade and investment this concerns competition 
policy rules for gas distribution systems within the EU, with negotiations ongoing internally 
over the degree of ‘unbundling’, and the related ‘Gazprom clause’ issue regarding the place of 
state-owned foreign investors. The broader issues of reciprocal rights for investment in the 
entire energy sector, for oil, gas and electricity are also on the agenda. President Medvedev, in a 
speech in Berlin on 5 June 2008, raised the idea of “establishing international consortiums that 
would operate transit pipelines with the participation of companies form Russia the European 
Union and the transit countries”. Such ideas would seem worth exploring: might the Ukrainian 
transit pipelines be jointly owned by the three parties, with no single party holding a controlling 
share? Such an investment, involving the EIB and/or the EBRD as well as private European 
investors, could become an exemplary act of good economic governance, replacing the murky 
dealings of the present Rosukrenergo/Naftogaz gas trading and transit arrangements. 
On climate change, as already mentioned, the negotiation process over the post-Kyoto or post-
2012 regime is now intensely engaged within the EU and at the international level. This could 
lead to an important EU-Russia element within the broader future international regime.  
As for the external security common space, the need for something of this type is obviously 
acute, contrasting with the lack of trust and real cooperation today over the unresolved 
secessionist conflicts. The agenda for conflict resolution and an improved European security 
architecture has already been discussed in some detail above. With a change in Russian tactics 
there could be major achievements from EU-Russian cooperation; for example a clear 
agreement to use (rather than stone-wall) the 5+2 format for negotiating a Moldova/Transnistria 
settlement could be an indicative confidence-building measure for the external security space. 
The space for cooperation in education is important, and one of the few items that both sides can 
agree to pursue actively even in a cold political climate, since this can prepare for a better 
tomorrow. 
The space for cooperation in justice and home affairs also has important potential for the freer 
movement of people, and for combating common soft security threats, principally drugs coming 
from Afghanistan.  
Overall the strategic relationship between the EU and Russia hardly advances beyond basic 
trade – oil and gas in exchange for investment and consumer goods. The potential for huge 
improvement is clear. In the final analysis this depends on strategic choices in relation to 
today’s big unknowns: whether the EU can strengthen the credibility of its civilisational concept 
for the whole of the wider Europe, whether Russia will be persuaded to reconsider the utility 
and sustainability of its current realpolitik offensive in the light of its needs for modernisation 
and improvement of its international political reputation. 
There could be confidence-building measures on both sides to get onto a better trajectory, to 
which we return in the conclusions.  
4.2  Pan-European security order 
President Medvedev declared in a speech in the Kremlin on 19 September:  “I have already said 
and I say again now that the idea of drafting a pan-European security treaty has become even THE STRUGGLE FOR A CIVILISED WIDER EUROPEAN ORDER | 9 
 
more relevant after the event in the Caucasus”. On 8 October in Evian he offered some detail on 
what he has in mind, to which we return in a moment.  
First, however, it is opportune to recall the content of the existing pan-European security treaty, 
the Helsinki Final Act of August 1975, negotiated with the Soviet Union. Should this be 
revisited? One might think so after over 30 years. Is it not obsolete? Let’s take a look. 
The Act's "Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States" 
enumerated the following 10 points: 
I.  Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty  
II.  Refraining from the threat or use of force  
III.  Inviolability of frontiers  
IV.  Territorial integrity of States  
V.  Peaceful settlement of disputes  
VI.  Non-intervention in internal affairs  
VII.  Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms  
VIII.  Equal rights and self-determination of peoples  
IX.  Co-operation among States  
X.  Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law 
As a set of norms for international security relations these old texts remain absolutely valid, not 
a word is out of date. What then does President Medvedev propose? He identifies Russia’s 
priorities under five points (see also an extract from his Evian speech in Annex A): 
1.  Political norms: respect for international law, sovereignty, territorial integrity, political 
independence of states. These largely conform with the Helsinki Final Act. However principle 
VII from Helsinki on human rights is omitted, while in the August war with Georgia Russia 
breached Helsinki principles III and IV.  
2. Security norms: inadmissibility of use of force or threat of its use in international affairs, and 
a unified approach to conflict settlement and peacekeeping. This is also following the Helsinki 
Final Act, but in the war with Georgia Russia was in breach of principle II restraining the use of 
force.  
3. The guarantee of equal security and three ‘no’s’, namely:  
-  No ensuring one’s own security at the expense of others. This is unclear and would lead 
to insoluble arguments. How can one define whether a measure for one’s own security 
is at the expense of others? Is a defensive alliance at the expense of the security of 
another neighbour? The target of the language seems to be the US missile defence 
project. 
-  No allowing acts (by military alliances or coalitions) that undermine the unity of the 
common security space. This appears to suppose that the common space exists, which is 
hardly the case; or maybe it is referring to a common space that should be created, in 
which case its mechanisms need to be explicit. 
-  No development of military alliances that would threaten the security of other parties to 
the Treaty. This presumably targets NATO expansion, and maybe that of the EU if it 
became more of a military alliance.  10 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
4. No state or international organization can have exclusive rights to maintaining peace and 
stability in Europe. This seems to be just a rhetorical statement, since no such monopoly exists; 
it seems to express resentment towards NATO, or the EU, or both. 
5. Establish basic arms control parameters and reasonable limits on military construction. Also 
needed are new cooperation procedures and mechanisms in areas such as WMD proliferation, 
terrorism and drug trafficking. This heterogeneous rubrique seems first to be proposing a 
renegotiation of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, and goes on to propose a new 
or improved non-proliferation regime. Cooperation over terrorism is already on the agenda of 
G8, OSCE and EU-Russia relations. Cooperation over drug trafficking is plausible, for example 
together with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Central Asia in particular. 
To summarise, the Medvedev proposal assembles a menu of items that start with some norms 
extracted from the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, several of which were breached by Russia in the 
August war with Georgia, followed by some newly formulated pseudo-norms that obviously 
seek to stop NATO’s expansion, and ends with a set of conventional security topics that are 
already on the agenda of international organisations and bilateral EU or US-Russia relations.  
We will return to the NATO question in a moment, but first look at reasons why the OSCE has 
not flourished and is not even mentioned by Medvedev. Within the OSCE itself there has been a 
debate in the last few years over its priorities, with Russia wanting to downplay work on 
democracy and election monitoring. But if it has to be like that within the OSCE, the result will 
be that the EU will do more on its own, for which it has the resources and experience. But this 
reallocation of tasks will only further weaken the only truly pan-European security organisation.  
To be fair to Russia, the EU is itself responsible for a large part of the OSCE’s political 
obsolescence and unwieldy procedures. OSCE has now 56 member states, all in principle 
enjoying the same sovereign equality, from Andorra and the Vatican to Russia and the United 
States, but with the EU only present as an observer. Its meetings resemble a mini-UN General 
Assembly. The EU accounts for almost half of the seats around a very large table, to which may 
be added the tendency nowadays for most of non-EU Europe to align on the EU’s foreign and 
security policy declarations The EU 27 becomes often a 42 country block. The EU member 
states account for 70% of the OSCE’s budget. Is it not time now for the EU to contribute a 
serious rationalisation of its presence in the OSCE, given the advances of its foreign and 
security policies, and the needs that are now obvious in view of Europe’s dysfunctional security 
order? A first step would be for the EU to become a full member of OSCE. A further step could 
be to create a core group of the major players within the OSCE, with a ‘European Security 
Council’, following in some respects the model of the UN Security Council. There has been 
some recourse to informal ad hoc meetings of core groups in OSCE, but this has not been 
institutionalised. A permanent European Security Council could consist of the EU, US, Russia, 
Turkey and Ukraine, with further rotating places such as one for the rest of non-EU Europe and 
one for Central Asia. Russia has in the past made proposals for something like a European 
Security Council. This was interpreted in the past, probably correctly, as seeking to acquire a 
veto power over European security matters, and was therefore never pursued. However the 
political role of such a body does not have to be formulated in such an obviously unacceptable 
form.  
Such a European Security Council would prepare actions to be submitted to the plenary, or take 
diplomatic initiatives as a group in the place of various ad hoc ‘contact groups’ which have by 
necessity emerged. For the EU this would impose the discipline and logic of internal negotiation 
over common positions. Without a common position there would be no position. A similar 
reform of the European presence among the permanent members of the UN Security Council, 
with France and the UK to pool their seats into a single EU seat, has begun to be discussed at 
least in non-official papers. This is at present beyond the horizon of political plausibility. But its THE STRUGGLE FOR A CIVILISED WIDER EUROPEAN ORDER | 11 
 
relevance will be enhanced as and when the Lisbon Treaty is adopted. An OSCE European 
Security Council could become a precursor experience. 
We return now to Russia’s major demand for the European security architecture that NATO 
should not press on with further enlargement into the post-Soviet space. A narrative deeply 
ingrained in the Russian political consciousness is that Gorbachev and Yeltsin were duped by 
the West over NATO enlargement, and that Kohl had given Gorbachev assurances that NATO 
would not be expanded to Russia’s frontiers in exchange for Gorbachev’s cooperation over 
German re-unification. Those supporting NATO’s further enlargement to include Ukraine and 
Georgia argue that any independent sovereign state in Europe has the right to apply for NATO 
membership, and no third party has the right to tell them otherwise. That is a serious argument, 
but is not the whole story. NATO membership involves the solemn commitment under Article 5 
to take an attack on any member’s territory as an attack on all. The counterpart to this strategic 
commitment is that the aspiring member state has to be a reliable partner. It has to be solidly 
behind the alliance politically, with no doubts over the credibility of its own commitment. It has 
also to have demonstrated sustained reliability for sound political judgement on strategic matters 
in times of stress. These two criteria – national consensus and political reliability – might well 
be adopted more explicitly by NATO, rather like the EU adopted its Copenhagen criteria for its 
enlargement.  
Neither public opinion nor the political parties in Ukraine are anywhere near united on the 
NATO question. The criterion should be far more than majority parliamentary support, and 
essentially a national consensus. And Georgia, while united behind the wish to be protected by 
NATO, has demonstrated precisely the reverse of sober reliability in matters of strategic 
behaviour.  
These weaknesses were evident enough already before the Bucharest summit, which attached no 
timetable to its forecast that Georgia and Ukraine “will be” members of NATO, some day. The 
candidates’ lack of qualifications for NATO membership has become even more evident since 
then. NATO will surely not reverse its Bucharest declaration explicitly, but it could move to 
define its ‘Copenhagen criteria’ more adequately, and in so doing shelve Bucharest for the 
foreseeable future. 
In due course, as and when some confidence between Russia’s leadership and the West is 
restored, there could be a return to explore possibilities for improving the Russia-NATO 
relationship. It is a striking anomaly that during the eight years of the Putin presidency there 
were only two meetings at the summit level between NATO and Russia. The problem is again at 
least in part on the European side, whose numerous small states make for the unwieldy 26+1 
format (becoming now 28+1 with the addition of Albania and Croatia and more to come) for 
NATO-Russia relations. To counter this one could innovate with a new G4 summit format for 
pan-European security affairs, bringing together Russia, the US, NATO represented by its 
secretary general, and the EU represented by its post-Lisbon presidency and high representative. 
This G4 could be considered as an alternative or complement to the hypothesised OSCE 
European Security Council.  
Returning to immediate practicalities, one may ask whether early results could flow in the event 
of a better personal chemistry between the next US President and the Russian leadership. Is it 
too late for the missile defence project to be made into a matter for operational cooperation, 
given that it is meant to address a common hypothetical threat from a rogue nuclear state, with 
Iran in mind in particular? A precise Russian argument is that the radar facilities to be installed 
in the Czech Republic could be used to track missiles launched from Russia, and so would alter 
the strategic balance of nuclear strike capabilities, and upset the (nuclear-strategic) logic of 
mutually assured destruction (M.A.D.). Is this so? If not, transparent consultations in good faith 
should dispel the concern. If it is so, then there is an issue for a next round of START talks. 12 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
4.3 Northern  Dimension 
The EU meets Russia now right across the map of Europe, from the Baltic to the Black Sea. But 
there is peace at one end of the map, war at the other end. What conclusions can be drawn from 
this? Finland took the initiative to promote a Northern Dimension to the EU’s policies of 
cooperation with Russia and the Baltic states in 1998, at the time of its first EU Presidency, 
soon after its accession in 1995. This sought to build on the long-standing tradition of ‘civilised’ 
cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. It may be recalled that Finland and Sweden managed 
already in 1921 with the mediation of the League of Nations to avoid a serious conflict over the 
Aaland Islands, following Finland’s independence from the Russian empire. The very 
autonomous status within Finland of the ethnic-Swedish Aaland Islands stands as a model of its 
kind, which unfortunately could not be replicated with analogous settlements of the conflicts 
that erupted in the Caucasus and Moldova upon dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
With the accession of the Baltic states to the EU the original Northern Dimension initiative was 
becoming politically obsolete, and in 1997 it was transformed into the New Northern 
Dimension, in which the EU, Iceland, Norway and Russia joined together under the principle of 
equal partnership. A recent study has evaluated the New Northern Dimension as an exercise in 
search of a sound neighbourhood relationship.
7 The initiative is deliberately designed to be 
insulated from the tensions in the high politics of the EU-Russia relationship, concentrating on 
practical problems of regional cooperation. The equality principle is put to work by deciding 
jointly on objectives that are of common interest to all the parties. This has translated in practice 
into programmes for the environment, public health, transport and logistics, energy efficiency, 
fisheries, and educational and cultural exchanges. Questions of democracy and human rights are 
not part of the agenda, notwithstanding the fact that the Baltic states are among the most ardent 
promoters of democracy worldwide. The proposition is advanced that the small states of the EU 
can get a lot done by pursuing ‘smart small policies’, in which trust is built on the basis of 
sustained practical cooperation, and a common sense of ‘Northern identity’ developed. Such 
activity can ‘fly below the radar’ of high politics. So this is part of the jigsaw puzzle of the 
wider Europe. The Northern Dimension can be viewed as a confidence building measure, valid 
for one corner or the map of Europe, and a positive example for other parts of the map where 
trust between Russia and its neighbours is close to zero. 
4.4 South-East  Europe 
EU policy towards the Western Balkans advances, with its ups and downs to be sure, but 
progressively the Western Balkans becomes a shrinking enclave within the enlarging EU. The 
Kosovo abscess has been lanced, if not yet entirely cleaned. Croatia’s accession is on the 
horizon, but without problematic aspects still (crime and corruption). Developments in Serbian 
politics are positive but fragile, with its financial situation also vulnerable. However it is time 
now for an upgrade of EU policy towards the not-yet member states, in order to consolidate 
positive developments during a period ahead when enlargement prospects will remain for most 
distant and uncertain. It is also now needed in order to strengthen the region economically and 
politically in the face of the global financial instability and recession.  
The means to achieve this upgrade exist, and a more detailed paper from CEPS sets out how and 
why EU policy towards the Western Balkans could now be recalibrated.
8 In essence the idea can 
                                                      
7 P. Aalto, H. Blakkisrud and H. Smith, The New Northern Dimension of European Neighbourhood, 
CEPS Paperback, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2008 (forthcoming).  
8 M. Emerson, Recalibrating EU Policy towards the Western Balkans, CEPS Policy Brief No. 178, Centre 
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be to advance towards ‘functional membership’ much more deeply than in the present pre-
accession policies This would be based on the EU’s key competences for trade, monetary 
policy, the structural funds and the free movement of people.  
Present free trade schemes should be overtaken by inviting the whole of the Western Balkans 
region to join the customs union of the EU and Turkey, to make one uninterrupted economic 
space from Western to South-Eastern Europe. This is advocated both in the CEPS paper and a 
recent World Bank study
9. 
Accession to the euro area before accession should be made a respectable option but not an 
obligation, with full membership of the EU and compliance with the Maastricht criteria still to 
apply before accession to the governance of the European Central Bank and eurozone finance 
ministers. In the current financial crisis there is the prospect of Montenegro and Kosovo 
escaping at least exchange rate instability because of their use of the euro, whereas Serbia 
remains exposed. It is to be expected that the International Monetary Fund, if subject to a flood 
of loan requests, will invite the EU to share the burden of helping nearby countries in need, as 
happened in the early 1990s when the EU co-funded lending operations of the IMF with its own 
macro-financial aid (MFA) instrument. However this precursor MFA instrument is an 
inadequate model for facing up to the new macro-financial emergency, and South East Europe 
from the Balkans to Turkey should be eligible for the European Financial Stability Fund 
outlined above (section 3).  
Currently the Structural Funds are planned for the years ahead to allocate 4 times per capita as 
much to new member states such as Bulgaria and Romania than to the Western Balkans under 
the comparable pre-accession instruments. Arguments for adjusting these ratios to be more in 
favour of the Western Balkans are weighty. Bulgaria and Romania reveal insufficient capacity 
for correct absorption of funds on the present scale, while the Western Balkans have large 
unsatisfied needs. Moreover the conditionality that the EU can deploy, for de-corruption 
policies for example, is far more effective in the pre-accession period than after accession.  
Finally the EU begins to address the move towards visa-free travel with the EU, which is maybe 
the single most important demand of the peoples of the region; this offers important possibilities 
to leverage in improved border security and internal law and order measures. 
The EU also extends its energy and transport policies into the whole of the region through the 
Energy Community Treaty, with an analogous initiative for transport planned. Already the 
energy treaty is being extended to include Moldova and possibly Ukraine. This makes a 
convenient bridge into the Eastern neighbourhood, to which we turn next. 
In 2008 the Stability Pact for South East Europe, born out of the Kosovo war in 1999 as a 
complex international post-conflict supervisory structure, was retired. Instead a new Regional 
Cooperation Council (RCC) has been set up, which is a regionally owned successor to the 
Stability Pact. The structures of both the Stability Pact and the RCC are summarized in Box 1 as 
a reference that may be borne in mind in discussion of next steps in the eastern neighbourhood 
and Caucasus, to which we return below.  
 
                                                      
9 S. Kathuria, Western Balkans Integration and the EU – An Agenda for Trade and Growth, World Bank, 
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Box 1. Organisation of the Stability Pact for South East Europe – 1999-2008 
Working Table 1 - Democracy 
Consists of 5 task forces: 
-  Media 
-  Education and Youth 
-  Local Democracy and Cross Border Cooperation 
-  Parliamentary Cooperation 
-  Gender Issues. 
Working Table 2 economics 
-  Matrix of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) between countries of the region.  
-  Formation of a South-East Europe Regional Energy Market for electricity and natural gas, 
leading to the recent creation of a common European Energy Community with the EU, with 
Moldova, Ukraine and Norway expected to join later.  
Working Table 3 security 
Internal and external security, with two sub-tables: 
-  Justice and Home Affairs, cooperation in fighting organised crime and corruption and on 
migration issues 
-  Defence and Security Sector Reform issues. 
Regional Cooperation Council – from 2008 
The Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) is programme-oriented, concentrating on five priority 
areas: 
-  Economic and social development 
-  Infrastructure and energy 
-  Justice and home affairs 
-  Security cooperation  
-  Human capital and cross-cutting issues 
Finally there is the Turkey question. At a recent conference of senior Turkish think tank 
representatives in Brussels, one of them qualified the state of the accession negotiations as being 
in a ‘coma’. But it cannot stay that way. The situation is unsustainable. It is undignified for 
Turkey to remain an applicant without receiving from the EU a coherent and clear position. The 
coma analogue is also not adequate, since there are movements in public and political opinion 
that look in other directions for Turkey’s future. The world to the east of Turkey is developing 
at astonishing speed, and the Asian economy rises in leaps and bounds. Whether Turkey needs 
the EU anchor, or whether it is going to continue to want, becomes a debatable question. 
Turkey’s political and societal cleavages are maybe more intense now than for many years, but 
it has averted a huge political crisis recently (over the AKP’s prosecution before the 
constitutional court), and may well continue on a bumpy but still democratic course. Its 
economy is quite competitive and can look to Russian and Asian markets for growth. 
Non-resolution of uncertainty over Turkey’s place in Europe poses a well-known set of 
questions: whether the EU’s own institutional set-up (post-Lisbon) could absorb Turkey and the 
several smaller applicants in South East Europe, and more profoundly whether European society 
and politics could adjust to Turkey’s full membership. Turkey for its part is well-placed to meet THE STRUGGLE FOR A CIVILISED WIDER EUROPEAN ORDER | 15 
 
the Copenhagen economic criteria, while its conformity with the political criteria is not yet 
clear. But while these criteria are themselves clear enough, Turkey is not being offered a clear 
enough incentive to meet them. The questions on the EU side will have to be addressed frankly, 
at least after the Lisbon Treaty hiatus is resolved. The time for ambiguity may run out for quite 
concrete reasons, maybe quite soon over the Cyprus question. For example, the leaders of Greek 
and Turkish Cyprus may advance towards a final settlement for re-unification, which the EU 
earnestly supports. One can envisage a scenario in which all is settled, except for the question of 
Turkish military withdrawal. One can also imagine a situation in which Greek Cyprus would 
insist on withdrawal, whereas Turkey would not be willing to concede this without clarity from 
the EU on its accession prospects.  
4.5 Eastern  Partnership 
This term was introduced by Poland and Sweden into EU foreign policy debate in the wake of 
President Sarkozy’s Mediterranean Union initiative. The Commission has been invited to make 
proposals for the European Council to consider early in 2009, and plans to publish its ideas in 
December. The assignment takes on greater urgency and priority in the wake now of the August 
war in Georgia.  
At the most general level the idea may be to upgrade the eastern branch of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which involves Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, with Belarus designated as a potential participant. The ENP itself is an unloved 
child, being criticised from the south as well as the east for its bundling together of these two 
quite different regions. Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia especially resent the fact that the ENP 
carries no membership perspectives. The Eastern Partnership initiative by Poland and Sweden, 
like Sarkozy’s Mediterranean Union, reveals political demands from within the EU itself, 
joining the complaints from the east and south, for specific regional identities to the two 
branches of the ENP.  
For the Eastern Partnership the following 9 points could be its defining characteristics. 
1. The Eastern Partnership would take over the eastern branch of the ENP as well as the Black 
Sea Synergy initiative. The term ENP would be dropped. From then on the Eastern Partnership 
and Barcelona/Union for the Mediterranean would develop as separate policies, albeit retaining 
much in common because of their common origin in the ENP and ongoing links to EU policies. 
In general terms the Eastern Partnership would aim at a qualitative upgrade of the ENP. 
2. The Eastern Partnership would create a forum for regional-multilateral political dialogue 
between all the partner states and the EU. This would facilitate the formulation of common 
positions on political, economic and security issues. For this to be operational there could be a 
sub-structure of specialised working groups for several policy areas, for which the experience of 
the Stability Pact for South-East Europe may be borne in mind (Box 2 above).  
3. Its content would take up developments emerging from the ongoing negotiations with 
Ukraine for a new model Association Agreement, including a comprehensive three-pillar 
structure (economics, justice and home affairs, foreign and security policy), and this would 
become a template for others later with adaptation to the specificities of the other partner states.  
4. In the trade policy domain negotiations are already underway for a new model Deep Free 
Trade Agreement with Ukraine (to be included in the Association Agreement), with feasibility 
studies having been recently undertaken for the Commission on Georgia and Armenia, and 
under preparation for Moldova. This forthcoming agreement with Ukraine will establish a 
template for other Eastern partners. Further, the Commission could invite the Eastern partner 
states to join CEFTA, which consists today of the Western Balkan countries, and who have free 16 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
trade between themselves and with the EU. This would lead on to the adoption of harmonised 
rules of origin permitting ‘diagonal cumulation’ of value-added, and so help stimulate intra-
regional trade and investment, as well assure duty free access to the EU market.
10  
5. The EU should make a contribution to countering the present economic and financial crisis 
now hitting the region with access, as for South East Europe, to emergency macroeconomic aid 
from the proposed European Financial Stability Fund (section 3).  
6. The Eastern Partnership could extend the EU’s experience in the Western Balkans, bearing in 
mind the proposals outlined above for upgrading the EU’s Western Balkan policies. As direct 
neighbours of the EU the Western Balkans have particular opportunities for transport and 
energy infrastructural and network connections, and for trade and investment linkages that profit 
from direct proximity. This same logic can be extended to Ukraine and Moldova given that they 
border the EU’s South East European member states. Moldova is already part of various South 
East European initiatives, including the new Regional Cooperation Council. Both Moldova and 
Ukraine negotiate accession to the Energy Community Treaty.  
7. The EU has prepared roadmaps and criteria for visa-fee travel with the Western Balkans, and 
plans to progress from visa facilitation to visa liberalisation figure in the negotiations with 
Ukraine. This merits urgent priority, given the long lead times that are required for introducing 
modern security standards to passports, intelligence exchange, police cooperation and border 
crossings. The roadmaps and criteria should be published, and so help develop consensus in the 
partner states over the steps they will need to take.  
8. The Eastern Partnership should see an upgrade of the EU’s presence in conflict prevention 
and resolution in the region, and notably for Transnistria and Nagorno Karabak in ways in the 
next section, with a conflict prevention strategy for Crimea also to be proposed. More broadly 
there would be increasing association of the partner states with foreign and security policy 
positions adopted by the EU, and participation in crisis management operations where useful 
capacities exist, for which Ukraine is the strongest placed. 
9. The EU is still divided over the membership perspective question. It is desirable to reach a 
common understanding on this key question, and remove a source of resentment with the 
partner states. The EU could move towards clearer language, like: “Any European democratic 
state is eligible to apply for EU membership and as such has a membership perspective. 
Applications will be conditioned by the Copenhagen criteria, together with the need for the 
EU’s institutional system to digest the recent huge enlargement and prepare adequately for 
further accessions”. 
4.6 Ethno-separatist  conflict 
Separatist conflicts have been the most virulent source of tension in contemporary European 
affairs. Could there be more adequate rules for ordering such conflicts in a new or better 
European security system? Such is the vague claim of Russia, but what would be the rules? The 
Helsinki 10 Principles make no provision for secession. International law recognises secession 
fully only when it is agreed by the parties concerned (e.g. the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 
1990), or in a Resolution of the UN Security Council (such as was attempted for Kosovo, but 
blocked by Russia). 
                                                      
10 ‘Diagonal cumulation’ allows the value added in a production chain of two or more countries to be 
cumulated for the purpose of reaching the minimum value added requirement for duty free access to the 
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Political scientists have proposed a rich set of criteria, such as those presented in Box 2, 
including the idea of the ‘just cause’ relating to the severity of the injustice suffered by the 
seceding party. The just cause argument has featured prominently in Western advocacy of 
recognition of Kosovo, given Milosovic’s acts of forced deportation, ethnic cleansing, and 
incipient genocide. The same argument is now used by Russia to justify recognition of South 
Ossetia’s independence, with the Russian media broadcast having branded Saakashvili’s attack 
on Tskhinvali on 7 August as ‘Genocide’. Indeed Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia destroys the supposed logic of its refusal to recognise Kosovo.  
Nobody has proposals for how to make the just cause principle tractable legally. How serious 
does the injustice have to be? Who makes the evaluation? Tricky questions, to be sure, but the 
law is always being called upon to pronounce on borderline or dilemma cases. There is a voting 
mechanism that allows the world to make its evaluation. Partial recognition can come in 
different degrees through official recognition by any number of UN member states, with or 
without the agreement of all the UNSC permanent members, and the number is maybe some 
guide to the strength of the case. Kosovo is recognised now by 50 states; South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia by Russia almost alone so far. Functional recognition is another form of partial 
recognition, such as Taiwan as member of the World Trade Organisation and issuer of Republic 
of China passports that can be used worldwide. Kosovo now produces its own passports, which 
will be generally accepted. 
Box 2. ‘Just Secession’ Criteria for the Recognition of a Unilateral Act of Independence 
1)  Secession should have a just cause. This means that the injustice to be prevented or remedied 
should be severe enough to justify the recognition of unilateral declaration of independence.  
2)  The decision to seize independence or to recognise a state that has seceded unilaterally should 
be guided by right intentions. This means that the unilateral declaration or recognition of its 
independence – either by the UNSC or unilaterally by some states – should be motivated 
primarily by considerations consistent with the just cause for independence.  
3)  Recognition of a unilateral declaration of independence can only be a last resort solution. All 
efforts to achieve a mutual agreement between the secessionist entity and the central 
government have to be considered as fruitless. 
4)  A unilateral declaration of independence has to be recognised through a legitimate authority. 
Partial recognition may be granted by a limited number of states. Full recognition by the world 
community of states generally means entry into the UN. 
5)  The principle of proportionality should be respected. The anticipated costs and benefits 
should be calculated at both the domestic and the international levels. 
6)  The recognition of a unilateral declaration of independence should have a likelihood of 
success in achieving its aims. There should be a reasonable chance of having the new state 
recognised in the long run by a substantial section or even the whole of the international 
community. 
Source: Bruno Coppieters, “The Recognition of Kosovo: Exceptional but not Unique”, in What is ‘Just’ 
Secession? (Is Kosovo Unique?), CEPS European Security Forum Working paper No. 28, 
February 2008. 
But maybe the future lies less in attempts to formalise more complex rules of international law, 
than with the processes of negotiation within the framework of the political paradigms of 
modern Europe, which has seen the transformation of the structure of sovereignty. The EU has 
given birth to the ‘post-modern’ paradigm, in which complex multi-tier political structures and 
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Northern Ireland case is an illustration with a complex structure of competences shared between 
the communities in Northern Ireland, with London and some also with Dublin. Such ‘post-
modern’ solutions are plausible given that all the unresolved separatist conflicts of 
contemporary Europe are complex multi-ethnic dilemma situations, themselves the legacies of 
history. The predominant historical commonality has been the legacy of empires, principally the 
British, Ottoman and Russian ones. The Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Kosovo, Transnistria, 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno Karabak conflicts all have their origins in hundreds of years 
of history, in which at some point imperial powers caused movements of people, or changed 
administrative borders in ways that sowed the seeds of today’s conflicts. Modern Europe is no 
longer about empires, but about complex democratic structures that take great care to devise 
compromises that accommodate complex ethno-national structures. Russia with its multi-
national structure at home, and its extensive diaspora abroad, has every interest in such 
solutions. It is for the EU, as a non-threatening and pre-eminently civilian European power, to 
persuade Russia to join in pursuing such solutions, rather than relapse into 19
th century 
nationalism and indeed imperialism. 
In a new pan-European order a priority should thus in any case be the resolution of remaining 
unresolved separatist conflicts: with the post-conflict situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to 
be arranged; peace settlements to be sought in Cyprus, Kosovo, Transnistria, and Nagorno 
Karabak; avoidance of new ethno-separatist conflicts, with Crimea the outstanding case that 
must not become the next disaster. So how might these old conflicts finally now be resolved, 
maybe in a big concerted push following the shock of the August war? 
Hopefully Cyprus will deliver a new model story. It already came close to a solution with the 
Annan Plan in 2004, but the failure there was one of not carrying the people along with the 
negotiation process, with the Greek rejection in the referendum. Since the change of leadership 
in Greek Cyprus in February 2008, it is now clear that both democratically legitimate leaders 
want to find an agreement. The ‘post-modern’ European model will remain at the heart of any 
solution, given the importance of EU competences that would reign over a re-unified Cyprus, 
and the likely thin competences of the central Cyprus authorities compared to the two 
constituent states. A new project by CEPS, which polls public opinion in both Greek and 
Turkish Cyprus on possible ingredients of a settlement, is encouraging.
11 
The Kosovo case should also in time yield to a cooperative outcome. For the time being EU can 
integrate Kosovo into its Western Balkan policies as far as possible, with Serbia now wanting to 
get onto a fast integration track. This should produce a gradual de-escalation of Serbian 
sensitivities. However the immediate situation is one in which the Serbian population of 
Northern Kosovo refuses the authority of Pristina, with the EU not yet able to intervene with its 
major rule of law mission.
12 Russia has a large responsibility for maximizing the difficulties, 
given its refusal to permit UNSC legitimation of Kosovo’s independence and its encouragement 
of Serb nationalist behaviour. The proposals outlined above for upgrading the functional 
integration of the whole of the region into the EU economy has to apply to Kosovo, and should 
focus attention in Serbia too on positive elements for the future. 
Transnistria has seen two model solutions. The Russian ‘Kozak memorandum’ of 2004 was a 
federative proposition with some quite standard constitutional features. But fatally it so 
overloaded the weight of Transnistrian representation that President Voronin refused to sign. 
Since 2006 there has been a Voronin ‘package deal’ on the table (not so far published), whose 
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main components are autonomy for Transnistria, confirmed neutrality, withdrawal of foreign 
troops, and assured property rights in Transnistria (i.e. no re-privatisation). The negotiation 
format is most active at the level of bilaterals between Chisinau, Tiraspol and Moscow, with 
less activity so far in the 5+2 format (Russia, Ukraine, OSCE, EU, US + Moldova and 
Transnistria). Russia could rehabilitate its reputation considerably with a willingness to back a 
reasonable compromise. The EU should push forcefully for the 5+2 format to be the principal 
negotiating forum. It should do this with the aid of a high level political representative for 
Moldova, with the professional support of the existing special representative. As an example of 
a heavy-weight politician who might fulfil this task one might think of Aleksander 
Kwasniewski, former President of Poland. 
The post-war situation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is the subject of the Geneva talks on 
security arrangements and IDP return issues, which began on 15 October 2008 with the 
participation of Russia, Georgia, EU, US, OSCE and UN. The non-recognition of the 
independence of these two entities by any party except Russia presented difficulties from the 
start, and this first meeting was abandoned over these so far unresolved issues of protocol and 
political principle. One scenario would see functional cooperation with both Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia by all parties, including the EU, but without formal recognition: new de facto 
states. There will be political reluctance to grant even this degree of implicit partial recognition, 
given that it may be perceived as a concession to Russia, which provoked the war. On the other 
hand Abkhazia (more than South Ossetia) does not want to be become part of the Russian 
Federation, but rather to start to develop now as part of modern Europe. This objective should 
be met with an open EU position for economic relations and people contacts.  
A move by the EU to cooperate functionally with Abkhazia and South Ossetia without 
recognition could be reciprocated by Russia over Kosovo, with it moving to a position of 
abstention, rather than blocking, over proposed EU actions there in cooperation with the UN.  
For Nagorno Karabak there have been years of attempts by the Minsk Group co-chairs (France, 
Russia, US) to mediate a settlement in Nagorno Karabak, and several episodes where agreement 
seemed close at hand. The content of these proposed settlements has been kept secret, but 
elements seem to include cession by Armenia of the occupied territories surrounding NK, 
guaranteed transport corridors for both NK into Armenia and for Nakichevan into Azerbaijan-
proper, and deferral of a final status agreement for NK. Ideas for settlement of the constitutional 
regime have included a special status for NK with links to both Armenia and Azerbaijan, which 
would be consistent with the province’s history over the centuries at the interface between 
Ottoman, Russian and Persian empires. NK could be open to the economies of both Armenia 
and Azerbaijan, with a provision for refugee return, notably to the former Azeri-majority town 
of Sushi.  
But in recent times there has been a lot of war talk in Baku, encouraged by Azerbaijan’s oil 
boom financing a build-up of military capacity. Perhaps the spectacle of the war in Georgia will 
at least silence such talk. More fundamentally the major powers should take the occasion now to 
make a concerted push for a settlement. The EU should take the occasion to properly structure 
its own role, with the EU taking over from France in the Minsk group (not excluding that a 
French diplomat could represent the EU). 
Russia and Turkey already seek to take the initiative over NK, both unilaterally. President 
Medvedev announces the wish to host a meeting in Moscow with both Armenian and Azeri 
leaders, with rumours in circulation that he offers Azerbaijan a certain realpolitik deal, with 
favours over Nagorno Karabak in exchange for assurances to route Azeri oil and gas exports via 
Russia. Turkey for its part seems to be moving towards normalisation of its relations with 
Armenia, with a view to mediating also with Baku over Nagorno Karabak. The process might 
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people, the removal of remaining Armenian claims (e.g. implicit in its constitution) to its earlier 
territorial frontiers, and moves in favour of historic reconciliation. In a further step Turkey 
might try its hand at mediating a settlement of the Nagorno Karabak conflict. Turkey has its 
special brotherhood relations with Azerbaijan, but it remains to be seen how far this can be 
mobilised to mediate a settlement. The EU could join with Turkey in taking a lead, in what 
could become an exemplary case of foreign policy cooperation between these two parties. 
Finally on Crimea, whose destabilisation must be avoided. Russia’s intentions are suspect on 
account of numerous semi-official/unofficial speeches and activities by Russian nationalist 
elements, including mayor Luzhkov of Moscow, notably contesting the commitments under the 
Sebastopol Treaty of 1997 to withdraw the Russian Black Sea Fleet by 2017, and stirring up 
inter-ethnic tensions with the Tartar communities. Official Russian spokesmen confirm plans to 
evacuate the Black Sea fleet to Novorossiysk, and indication of progress in building the new 
base and a date for the move to begin would be a strong confidence-building measure. It would 
be further helpful for the Russian authorities to use their influence to cool down Russian 
nationalist activism that aggravates tensions in Crimea, and for the EU to urge Kiev to employ 
exemplary policies towards the non-Ukrainian nationalities (Russian and Tartar) in Crimea. 
These national minority issues could be subject to conflict prevention initiative to be conducted 
by civil society organisations, to which Europeans might usefully contribute as a neutral party 
between the interested parties.  
4.7 Stability  Pact  for the Caucasus 
For the South Caucasus there is a return to the question of whether the war in Georgia could 
have as a positive sequel the organisation of a comprehensive initiative for future regional 
cooperation, in a ‘Stability Pact for the Caucasus’. This idea surfaced first as a Turkish initiative 
in 2000, in the wake of the Stability Pact for South East Europe. That initiative was never really 
worked out at the official level, although this was done unofficially by CEPS.
13 Turkey returns 
now with the idea of a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform, but as far as we know this 
is not yet detailed operationally.  
The way could be opened to negotiate such a pact only after a settlement has been reached for 
Nagorno Karabak, as well as arrangement of the new Abkhazia and South Ossetia situations. 
The agenda would be substantial, and here the experience of the Stability Pact for South East 
Europe would be useful, including the agendas of the three working tables for economics, 
security and politics, for which more specialised sub-groups proved necessary, and the recent 
transformation of the Stability Pact into a regionally owned organisation, the Regional 
Cooperation Council (see Box 2 above). A South Caucasus Stability Pact might have an 
institutional structure and set of working groups, as in Box 3.  
As and when a Stability Pact for the Caucasus might begin to take shape, the question would 
arise of a permanent secretariat, its structure and location. On matters of structure one may 
suppose that there would be a core Council of the three fully recognised states of the region. The 
difficulties already encountered in the Geneva talks over how to include Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia would have to be resolved. There might be an issue also over Nagorno Karabak, 
depending on how its future may be defined. Realistically, there would have to be a functional 
place for Abkhazia and South Ossetia as partly recognised or de facto states. The Northern 
Cyprus model may be borne in mind in two respects, both for the EU’s functional cooperation 
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there without formal recognition, and awareness that re-unification may sometimes happen even 
after decades of conflictual separation.
14  
Box 3. Workings of a South Caucasus Stability Pact 
Political and institutional 
  Establishment of a South Caucasus Community, with a governing Council 
  + Associates (Iran, EU, Russia, Turkey, US)  
  A Parliamentary Assembly 
Economic policy 
  External and intra-regional trade and market integration policies 
Transport infrastructures and coordination 
Energy infrastructure and market coordination 
Security 
  Security arrangements in and around the former conflict zones 
  Security sector reform 
  Cooperation over combating organized crime and drug trafficking 
People 
  Refugee and IDP return and assistance 
  Education and youth initiatives 
  Inter-ethnic truth and reconciliation initiatives 
To this 3+3 format could be added the major external powers and neighbours with associate or 
observer status (Russia, Turkey, Iran as land neighbours, and EU and US), therefore 3+3+5.  
On matters of location, given the sensitivities between former conflict parties, it might be that at 
least in the near future none of the capital cities of the South Caucasus would be politically 
feasible. In this case a candidate location would be Istanbul, which is the best logistic hub for 
meetings bringing together officials from the region and the rest of Europe. It could also profit 
from the presence of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization (BSEC) which is 
headquartered there.  
While this idea of a Stability Pact for the Caucasus is of interest, there would have to be choices 
between this and several overlapping initiatives, which on the EU side includes the Eastern 
Partnership and Black Sea Synergy, and with the BSEC organisation perhaps in a position to get 
a new lease of life in the event that the Caucasus conflicts are resolved. The three states of the 
region seem not keen to concentrate on their ‘Caucasus identity’, and Georgia clearly prefers to 
build on a wider Black Sea and European identity. This might leave a Caucasus initiative to deal 
with a modest agenda of technical issues of local cooperation.  
4.8  Central Asia strategy 
The EU has begun to invest in a Central Asia Strategy, whose content is planned to be both 
bilateral and regional. The bilateral agendas are intended to focus “on issues such as human 
rights, economic diversification, energy and other sectoral issues, including youth and 
education”. The regional approach is considered suitable for common challenges “such as 
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organised crime, trafficking (of humans, drugs and weapons), terrorism, non-proliferation, inter-
cultural dialogue, energy, environmental pollution, water management, migration as well as 
border management and transport infrastructure”.
15 This EU effort to enter the Central Asian 
scene, alongside the heavy-weight presences of Russia and China, is sometimes supposed to 
have little chance of becoming significant. This would be a mistake for reasons noted in the first 
publications from a project that is now engaged in an independent monitoring the new EU 
strategy.
16  
This study notes several drivers of change in the region, belying the apparent immutability of 
the leaderships such as of President Nazabayev of Kazakhstan and of President Karimov 
Uzbekistan. The elites of most countries of the region are now making generational change, 
with the new generations more ready to support reform and modernisation. New middle class 
groups wish to be more involved in decision-making, and to secure modern educational 
opportunities for their children. Geopolitically the countries of the region, and most notably 
Kazakhstan, are wishing to pursue multi-vectoral foreign policies, avoiding renewed domination 
by Russia, or new domination by China. These transformation factors are favourable to an 
increasing EU presence, which can benefit from a degree of trust that neither Russia nor China 
win.  
There emerges a new regional asymmetry, with the rise of Kazakhstan as the fastest growing 
and richest economy with notable hydrocarbon and other mineral resources. Kazakhstan seeks 
to establish a serious relationship with Europe, as evidenced by its successful drive to secure 
chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010, its expressions of interest in the European Neighbourhood 
Policy and the Council of Europe, and most notably by its publication in September 2008 of a 
detailed policy statement entitled “The Path to Europe”. This programme is pragmatic, and 
concentrated on the objective of modernizing the economy’s technologies, regulatory policies 
and network connections: agricultural technologies: thus agricultural technologies and norms, 
energy investments and policies, transport norms and inclusion in the pan-European corridors, 
climate change and environment policies, industrial product standards and entry into European 
standard setting bodies, polices towards small and medium sized enterprises etc. This provides a 
solid basis for negotiating a wide-ranging new agreement with the EU. It is not ambitious in 
political and foreign and security policy content, with just a reference to drawing on European 
experience in inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations. However this may be the most 
plausible basis for deepening the EU-Kazakhstan relationship, with this entry into the area of 
European norms starting at the technical end. 
How might the EU respond to this? The EU has welcomed “The Path to Europe” in general 
terms. More operationally the EU could follow its practice in the European Neighbourhood 
Policy of recognising certain states as privileged partners, as with Ukraine in the Eastern 
neighbourhood and Morocco to the South, with both of whom advanced association agreements 
are now being negotiated. The Central Asian countries all have Partnership and Association 
Agreement, dating back to the mid-1990s, and which are in need of updating. Kazakhstan is 
clearly positioned among the Central Asian countries to benefit from an analogous treatment, 
i.e. embark upon negotiation of a new general agreement. Kazakhstan could be invited to join in 
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the Eastern Partnership initially maybe as an observer, and also the Black Sea Synergy 
programme, given that this embraces important transport and energy links.
17  
Among the list of plausible operational priorities for the EU in the region, one candidate could 
be a boost to multilateral efforts to secure cooperation agreements between the states of the 
regions in the field of hydro-electric electricity and water management, and in particular to help 
the poorest states of the region, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. New hydro projects to exploit a 
much greater share of the potential would require multi-billion dollar investments, and require 
consortium financing to which the Asian development Bank, the Eurasian Development Bank, 
the World Bank and the EBRD could be major contributors. Participation by the European 
Investment Bank would require a decision by the EU to give it a mandate to operate in the 
region. As explained in Box 4, technical solutions exist in principle to correct the 
catastrophically inefficient, non-cooperative regime of recent years. There is already an EU 
Water Initiative, but this remains so far a limited technical assistance project, and needs to be 
upgraded in order to engage with the strategic challenge. For example the EU could co-sponsor 
with the World Bank discussion around a long-term regional, cooperative strategy. The political 
tensions in the region over water and power supplies, especially between Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan, have been very serious. However at the time of writing, on 18 October 2008, there 
was after many years of blockage a breakthrough at a 5-party meeting in Astana with agreement 
on elements of multilateral cooperation for the immediate future. This could provide a basis on 
which to prepare more ambitious plans for the future.  
Box 4. The cost of coordination failure in the energy-water-food nexus in Central Asia 
The failure of Central Asia states to cooperate over a better use of hydro-electric resources means 
that people are freezing in winter and starving in summer, notwithstanding the region’s huge 
endowment with energy and water. According to the Eurasian Development Bank Tajikistan 
currently exploits only 5% of its hydro potential.
18 At present Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan draw 
down much of their reserves of water in order to generate electricity during the winter, but this 
floods downstream Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan when the water is not needed, whereas in the 
summer there is a shortage of water for irrigation, leading to increasingly severe food shortages. 
There are technical solutions on offer. The downstream countries could export energy (coal, gas, 
electricity, oil) energy to the upstream countries in exchange for a better regulated release of 
water. Also further damns could be constructed in cascades, so that water released by the top 
damns to generate electricity could be held in reserve in lower dams. However this would require 
agreement over the terms of the exchange of energy for water. In addition international law on 
transnational water basins requires agreement by downstream countries to major investments in 
hydro-power stations in upstream countries, and the international financial institutions will not 
make such investments in the absence of agreement between the parties.
19 Such agreements have 
not been forthcoming despite many years of fruitless negotiation, until 18 October 2008 when 
some progress was made. Turkmenistan will be supplying electricity to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 
via Uzbekistan; Uzbekistan will supply gas to Kazakhstan if the latter will supply oil and coal to 
Kyrgyzstan, and there will be agreed controls over water supplies.  
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The EU already largely funds a major UNDP executed border management programme 
(BOMCA), and is positioned also to support increasingly the work of the UN Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC), which sponsors the Central Asia Regional Information Coordination 
Centre (CARICC), and which can link to the work of Europol.  
The EU Strategy retains in principle a human rights initiative, which involves human rights 
dialogue with the governments of Central Asia member states. The EUCAM monitoring 
project’s assessment of the first year is critical, noting that the EU has so far failed to engage 
strongly with civil society in the region, and has confined itself to official dialogue behind 
closed doors.  
The EU could connect with an initiative of the Asian Development Bank, called the Central 
Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC). This involves the five Central Asia states and 
China, as well as the Bank. A thrust of this project is to improve transport corridors from China 
through Central Asia, which in principle finds a natural partner in the EU’s programme to 
extend the Pan-European corridors through the Black Sea/Caucasus region into Central Asia.  
To summarise, with its Central Asia now into its second year, the EU should now sharpen its 
priorities on a few major items where there it could achieve a real perceptible impact. The 
proposal is here is that the priorities should be (1) a new advanced agreement with Kazakhstan, 
(2) upgrading of its engagement in the energy-water-food nexus, to help especially Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan, (3) extension of the human rights dialogue beyond government into civil 
society, (4) continued investment in border management, especially for drug flows from 
Afghanistan, and (5) cooperation with the Asian Development Bank’s CAREC initiative. Every 
effort should be made to undertake several of these items (2, 4, 5) cooperatively with both 
Russia and China.  
5. Conclusions 
The Georgia-Russia war of August 2008 has been a seismic political event. Viewed by some as 
the ‘return of power politics’, an alternative would be to see it as a renewed outbreak of 
uncivilised behaviour at the outer edge of Europe. The financial crash, which initially hit US 
and European banks hardest, now becomes an economic seismic event with the onset of global 
recession, and with the fragile transition economies of Eastern Europe hit hard. Together with 
the formidable energy security and climate change agendas, these are the factors that should be 
at the heart of the forthcoming revision of the European Security Strategy.  
In this situation the EU needs to upgrade its policies across the whole of the wider Europe, from 
the Balkans to Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia. The peoples of Europe have a good 
essential understanding of what ‘civilised Europe’ means: peace, absence of the use or threat of 
coercive force between states, the rule of law, human rights, democracy, reasonable honesty in 
international discourse, moderation of old nationalisms. According to opinion polls European 
public opinion looks to the EU to pursue these objectives with a more effective foreign and 
security policy.  
But Russia’s leadership currently follows a very different track, of power politics indeed. The 
more Russia indulges in coercive or threatening behaviour towards its neighbours, the more it 
antagonises them, and deepens the split between Russia and the rest of Europe that abhors such 
behaviour. The task at hand for the EU is to not to join in a primeval struggle of power politics 
with this unruly Russia, for which it is in any case not equipped. That can be left to the US, 
maybe, if its next President so chooses. The EU should instead engage in a different rapport de 
forces, in which the EU deepens and widens the Europe of ‘civilised’ normative behaviour, until 
Russia and Russians draw their own conclusions as to who and what they want to be and where 
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EU strategy has to build up the credibility of its actions to boost its model for the wider Europe. 
The norms are attractive in themselves, but they still have to be buttressed by institutions, laws 
and political and economic investments. The list of actions can be summarized under the 
following eleven headings: 
i.  the institutional innovations of the Lisbon Treaty – the permanent President of the 
European Council, the double-hatted High Representative, the External Action Service, 
and the Permanent Structured Cooperation in the defence field. 
ii.  the strengthening of the EU’s energy policy, with a vast diversification agenda for 
diversification (nuclear, solar, wind), infrastructures (pipeline interconnections at home 
and pipeline and LNG reception facilities), and competition and regulatory policies; with 
climate change policy also working for an improved energy supply/demand balance 
worldwide. 
iii.  as and when negotiations between the EU and Russia over a new agreement are resumed, 
the agenda should be extended beyond the existing ‘four common spaces’ towards 
achieving a strategic understanding on the entire landscape of pan-European issues. 
iv.  a critical but constructive response to President Medvedev’s call for a pan-European 
security architecture, with the EU to lead in a reform of the OSCE, including a 
rationalisation of the EU’s presence there, and creation of a core group of major actors in 
a European Security Council.  
v.  a more adequate definition of criteria for future NATO enlargements, including the need 
for a strong national consensus in the candidate state, and a sound record of responsible 
strategic behaviour.  
vi.  a deepening of the Russia-NATO relationship as soon as the direction of affairs can be 
turned back towards a re-building of trust, with a properly institutionalised summit 
process, missile defence to become a cooperative project, and at some stage renegotiation 
of the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty. 
vii.  opening of a European Financial Stability Fund, which would not only support European 
banks but also make available large-scale macro-financial loans to countries in need 
across the whole of Central and Eastern Europe, and so limit the recession and risks of 
political instability.  
viii.  an upgrading by the EU of its policies in the Western Balkans, with a move from free 
trade to customs union, opening of the option for countries of the region to accede 
unilaterally to the eurozone, substantial increases in structural funds as well as access to 
the proposed stability fund, and rapid moves towards visa-free travel with the EU. 
ix.  launching by the EU of the Eastern Partnership to replace and upgrade the Eastern branch 
of the European Neighbourhood Policy, just as the Barcelona Process-Union for the 
Mediterranean similarly replaces its Southern branch. This should see a clarification of 
membership prospects for at least the closest neighbours, and important economic 
initiatives (deep free trade agreements and access to the proposed stability fund). 
x.  upgrade of the EU profile in the remaining unresolved conflicts in the Caucasus and 
Moldova, and a conflict prevention initiative for Crimea. 
xi.  development of cooperative actions in Central Asia, with priority to supporting 
Kazakhstan’s ‘Path to Europe’, and hydro-electric and border management projects 
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This list includes items that respond constructively to some plausible Russian arguments, even 
if its coercive actions over the last few months and years are incompatible with a wider civilised 
European order. A phase of confidence-building measures on both sides could signal the 
beginnings of a new trajectory. For example points above on NATO and OSCE would be 
important gestures from the EU, while Russia could desist from the kind of coercive actions 
seen in many incidents over the last two years, and show itself open to genuine cooperation over 
the remaining unresolved conflicts in Europe. 
A realistic Russia will recognise that it does not hold all the cards, with serious weaknesses in 
its economy, demography and international political reputation. The EU has to find the political 
will and unity to craft a strategic understanding with Russia, which would see a convergence on 
civilised norms for the wider Europe. Every decade or so the EU is confronted with strategic 
challenges for which its traditional structures prove obsolete, and which therefore require 
systemic change. Such were the stories of completing the internal market and the monetary 
union in the 1980s and 1990s. Today it is confronted simultaneously with the double challenges 
of the global financial crisis and a revanchist Russia.   
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Annex A. Extract from the speech by President Medvedev to 
the World Policy Conference, Evian, 8 October 2008 
“This system should be equal for all states – without isolating anyone and without zones with 
different level of security. It should consolidate the Euro-Atlantic region as a whole on the basis 
of uniform rules of the game. And it should ensure in stable and legally binding form our 
common security guarantees for many years to come. 
My partners often ask me what would be new in the Treaty. Here in Evian I would like to 
present for the first time some specific provisions as I see them. 
First. The Treaty should clearly affirm the basic principles for security and intergovernmental 
relations in the Euro-Atlantic area. These principles include the commitment to fulfil in good 
faith obligations under international law; respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
political independence of states, and respect for all of the other principles set out in the truly 
fundamental document that is the United Nations Charter.  
Second. The inadmissibility of the use of force or the threat of its use in international relations 
should be clearly affirmed. It is fundamental for the Treaty to guarantee uniform interpretation 
and implementation of those principles. The treaty could also cement a unified approach to the 
prevention and peaceful settlement of conflicts in the Euro-Atlantic space. The emphasis should 
be on negotiated settlements that take into account the different sides’ positions and strictly 
respect peacekeeping mechanisms. It would perhaps be useful to set out the dispute resolution 
procedures themselves.  
Third. It should guarantee equal security, and I mean equal security and not any other kind of 
security. In this respect we should base ourselves on three ‘no’s. Namely, no ensuring one’s 
own security at the expense of others. No allowing acts (by military alliances or coalitions) that 
undermine the unity of the common security space. And finally, no development of military 
alliances that would threaten the security of other parties to the Treaty. 
We need to concentrate on military and political issues because it is hard security that plays a 
determining role today. And it is here that we have seen a dangerous deficit of controlling 
mechanisms recently.  
Fourth. It is important to confirm in the Treaty that no state or international organization can 
have exclusive rights to maintaining peace and stability in Europe. This applies fully to Russia 
as well. 
Fifth. It would be good to establish basic arms control parameters and reasonable limits on 
military construction. Also needed are new cooperation procedures and mechanisms in areas 
such as WMD proliferation, terrorism and drug trafficking. 
Our joint work on the Treaty should also assess how the structures established in the past meet 
modern requirements. I stress that we do not seek to abolish or even weaken anything that we 
have now. All we want is to achieve more harmonious work together on the basis of a common 
set of rules.  
Life will show us the best platform for negotiations. And if we agree to go ahead with this 
project it will be essential to get the international expert community involved. 
Let me stress that we are open for discussing other possible elements of the Treaty as well. But 
whatever the case, we must speed up our efforts to fix the European security architecture. If we 
do not, we will only see it degrade further, as well as face growing crisis in security and arms 
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True, the non-proliferation regime we inherited is not best suited to today’s tasks. But even this 
regime has not exhausted its positive potential, although there are some obvious problems, such 
as cracks and holes in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, lack of progress in making the 
Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxic Weapons more effective, and also the 
murky prospects for entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
We attach exceptional importance to concluding a new, legally binding Russian-American 
agreement on nuclear disarmament. It should replace the START Treaty that expires in 2009. 
But what we need is a treaty and not a declaration. We hope for a positive reaction to our 
proposal from the USA. 